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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
at least unite and steel the Nation !or
tbe dangerous days whJch lie ahead.
nu: P&06J'1ECt'IS

f'Ot.ICIF:S Ill I'I:CfiNG Gll>t>IANT

Mr. MANSl"lEI..O. Mr. President, I,
too, wlsh to speak on the Gt'1·mnn question. I am sorry ~hnt 1 did no~ complete
the prepnrnllon or my SPCC'Ch In time to
gtve copie$ ~o my collcMues. to ~he omcia! Rcportct'S, or to the prc~s.
I nm v.rnteful lo the Senator from
ConnecttcuL for showmg me and others
or his colleagues-If no~ all oc them-the
courte:.y o! S<'ndlnft to us copies o! the
m:umlflcent speech "hlch he has just
completed. 1 comm.-nd h!m most hi!thl.v,
bccau!«' 1 tlltnk he h:~s made a real contribution to the publtc understanding of
thiS mo~;t Important problem I believe
that 1n emphttSII.HlG t.he difficulties which
•;uti race our country and the free world
on or before May 2'7. he has rendered a
se1 vtce whtch should be nppreclated by
all.
He minced. no words In his speech. I
shall mine~ no words In mine As a
US. St>nator ftom the State of Mont-1\na, hkt> the U.S. Senntor from the
Staw or Connecticut or any other State,
lllavt' a duty a.ud a responsibility to call
m~· :;hots M I see lh('lll, to let the cards
fall wher(' thc:y mn.y.
So w1th tlus apoio·::y lo my cc-llea!l'lles.
the omc:nl Reporters of Debates, and
t.he pre.~s for noL huvln"' a prPp:tred. copy
of mv liPPCch. nnd wllh my pubhc commendatton and congratulations to the
dtst!n~:ulshcd Senator ft•om Connecticut
for making an excell<'nt speech and Jayin~; i~ on the llno. 1 wish 1.0 say thanks
because he hns t'l'ndet·cd n public scrv1ce.
I hol)c oth<'r Scnllt<li'S, ln addition to·the
ScnnLOr from Connecticut nnd the Senator from New York, w11! hk!!WISe t.ake
the floor and t1 y to lC'l the people or this
country nnd the world know JUSt what
the Anwncan positiOn r!:, and to c-mpha:.11-e ~hnt, tesnrdlcss of any differences
as LO hO\\ we ~hall nchteve our objective,
ther~· nre no dllfcrl'nces so fnr as our deSire und our dCt('rmmntJ.on t<> remain
1n West Bl'rlln nrc concl'rned.
Some day~; ago, I discussed In the
Senate the comm~: ct·i:>l!> m Germany.
Other Member.. have llince contrtbuted
to ttw dt:-cusslon or this critical matter.
Thnt 1s nil w tlw good. I run persuaded.
that out of thl~ turmoil of thought v.;u
come a nun nnd po.~tu~e policy, a policy
"hie h. c,·cn If 11. docs not ~It' lei a rapid
resolution o! the G\.'tman situation,

''ill

l.H OgLMAHT

Let there be no mistake about what
does lle ahead This Js no diplomatic
lark on which the world 1s about to embark at .Berlln. This Is no child's piny
c! blind man's bulr.
When I addressed the Senate on li',ebruary 12, Mr. President, I made a deletion from my remarks just a !ew moments before I delivered. them. I did so
because I dld not v.1~b to be undulY
alarmist. Now the same thought has
been expres..o;ed. by the Prime Minister ot
the United Kingdom. n has been reco~:
ruzed by Members or thls body such as
the dtstingulshed Senntor from Kentucky tMr. COOPER1 and lncreasmgly by
the press. It 1s at le~~ beginning to
smk home that the world ts entering
mto a situa~ion in Germany in which
the lives of tens o! mtlhons or peopleAmericans Included-may well balance
on the avoidance ot a single slgnlficnnt
error.
The British Prlme Minister warned,
thll other dny, of a suicidal war by "miscalculation." As the disllngulshed Senator from Kentucky I Mr. MORTON J, e.
former Assistant Secret<'\TY of State. hn.s
said this afternoon. the British Prime
Minister also used the word "muddling."
I can say now "'1th !(renter MSurnnce
what I intended t.o say but deleted from
my remarks on February 12: "I express
to the Senate my b('llef that just ahead
lies n period which may well see the
Nation and the rest of tht> world miltS a
devastating war by a very narrO\\ mnrgln Indeed, tt Is a penod whleh may
see us m war. lun1ted. "nr or unlimltl'd
war. war by acc1dent or war by design, war by childish stubbornness or
bravado.''
TKE 1tESPONSf:BU,..fTT 0.1' S!:NATOftS IN THE
1:-.IP£'~ OlNC (;Rl$14

It that is the case Mr. President, whot
are the Members of this body to do?
Are they to guard their silence when
conscience compels them to speak? Are
they to t~more their respons1b!llt1cs t<>
their States and our country as lh!'y sec
those responsibilities? Are they to accept as all-PCI'vaslve the undoubted
wisdom of the President and the executive branch of the Government? Or
are they to think !or them~;elves nnd
speak for themselves?
Are they to be more concerned with
how words will sound abroad, and so hold
their peace? Or must thry, even mot·c.
seek to dtspel any uncertainties or the
people of the Nation as to the coul'se
which this Government Is pursuing, and
to seek to do so by exnmtnlnR' the Issues
which underlie that course? Are they
to wait untllthey hcnr whnt the Dep:~rt
ment of State has to say on the matter
and then parrot agreement? Are they
to wait to bear \\hat Mr. Khrushchev
hns t<> say, so that they may be sure
that what they sub:>equently ~ay v.lll be
in disavreement?
I do not know wbnt others may contend in this matter. I can speak only
for myself. For myself, Mr. President,
I can say only that v.hc-n con.o;clence
compels me to speak, I owe 1t t<> the

people or my State and our country to
speak out. For myself, Mr. President,
I hold that the most important matter
15 not how people abroad may Interpret
my words. Important as that may be,
lt is more Important that the people of
my Stnte and our country understand
fully what is at stake In this situation.
More Important is the need of the people of the United States to be satls6ed.
that the course to whJch they are committed by their Government 1s a sound
one. It t.hey are. to be asked to give their
lives, as well they may be. then the course
or this Government must represent the
outgrowth or policies which reflect the
deepest needs of tl}e people of the United.
States. They must be policies which nre,
In fact,, the best that can be devised by
this Government to safeguard the Nation and freed.om, and to do so, 1! possible, In peace.
Mr. President, to those who say we
may upset people abroad by our discussions. I can only replY that we do not
cool nnyone abroad If we fool ourselves
nt home. The unity of the slogan may
well be no unity at all. It may well be
merely the facade of unity: the Communist the totalllarlan concept of unity.
The unlty of free man needs to rest
on firmer ground. For the grim days
which lie ahead in Germany, this Nation
needs the unity which can come onlY
from an understanding of where we
stand. where It 1s we are headed, and why.
To stand fast In Germany. as Indeed we
must. we need. to think carefully. to think
deeply, and we need to do it now. We
need to speak out seriously, soberly. and
we need lo do It now. The time to examme pollctes is before. not after. their
consequences are upon us. I emphasize
that point-before. not after-as In
Korea a few years ago.
POSffiON ON lWI. DI7LUS

Mr. President, I yield to no one In my

appreciation or the enormous burdens of
the Secretary or State and his Depnrtment. charged., as they are. with Prlmary
respOnsibility, under t.he President, !or
the Nation's policies. I believe the
record or my poslt.ion in this matter Is
very clear. I regard Mr. Dulles, as I
have since I have known him, as an able
and a dedicated civil seryant. I have
endorsed many of the policies which have
been pursued since he took office. I have
worked wllh him closely, very closely, on
several of these matters. I have never
Celt, however, that Lhls constrained upon
me a silence when I disagl'eed: nor, I am
sure. did he. I favor the continuance of
Mr. Dulles In office now. not out of any
sentimentality, but because I believe that
It his health permits, Mr. Dulles 1s capable of making an extremely shmiftcant
t.:ontrtbutlon to the security of the Nation
and to the search for peace, particularly
M this time.
I do noL believe In the concept of the
indispensable man. However. I do bell!!ve Lhat there are times ~•hen a snan
may become vlrtuaUy indispensable.
Becnuse or what Mr. Dulles has done over
the past several months. cist>eclally durIng the p~t several weeks. In going to
Western Europe and dlscussinl!' the B~'r
lin and German matters with our albes,
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and because ot hb ereat. C..''\PQCity, hlS
~eat. knowledge, his great. ability, and
the leadership which he has displayed,
ln.sofar as t.he Berlin and ~rman situations arc concerned, he Is tn a \'Cry large
sense lnd.isJX'nsnble.
I hope that. any conferences covering
these t'lllio questions- because they are
interrelatcd-'1\111 be held In Washington. "'·here "'c can mnkc use of 1\tr.
Dulles' capaciLles and abilities, t.o ad\ise
and leAd the West.
In the last. anal)"Sis, whether his health
'11.'111 permit him to make thnt contribution ts for the President, the Secretary,
and his doctors to decide, u the President so CO(Ienlly point~ out In hl.s press
conference of February 25. 1959.
Let me emphasize, howev('r, that because Mr. Dulles Is Ill Is no reason !or
dcclartne a momtortum on a. fmnk and
Iull discussion of the Nation's policies
In the ll(lht or the critical slt.uatlon in
Germany, I! 1 know Mt·. Dulles at all,
he would be the first to recognize U1e
need tor this dlscu~ion to continue. He
would be the fil'llt. to denounce any
ghoullsh political prontecrlng on his 111nes In order to silence this dtscusslon.
There arc those who have expressed
contusion as to how 1 can support :I.Ir.
Dulles' continuance In omcc and still
crltlcl7.c some of the policies executed
under his name. I can only say that It
1s not the first time, and I hope 1t is
not the last. We shall have reached a
very low point, Indeed, In the pract.lce
of free and responsible £Overnment when
a Senator hns no choice but to agree
100 percent wiLh a secrctni'Y o! St:l.te
or to hane him in emgy.
I intend~ to go on as I have In this
matter. 1 shall rndorse the foreign
policies or lhls administration when 1
believe they arc sound policies. I shall
try to contribute constructh·ely to tneir
reshapme when I believe that they are
not-I repeat the word "constructively,"
bccau~c I have always tried to operate
constructlvrty. Thnt ts a position, Mr.
President, which I have maintained since
I entered this body, and also during the
10 year prior thereto when I serv~ as a
mcmbrt· of the Committee on Foreign
A.Jralrs of the House of Representatives.
It 1s the position T propose to maintain so
long ns I nm In the Sennte. I sh:lll
D'UI.1nt.aln It regnt'CIII'SS of the party which
Is responsible tor the ndmlnlstration or
the Nallon's nffalrs.
ATnTU1)& OS Ma, JtiDIOSIICnEV

Further, I propose to say v.hat. I
have to say when I h11.ve to say It, l.rrespect.lve or Mr. Khrushchev's threats or
blandlshment.s.. It ls, to me, a matt~r
or lndltrerence whether :.tr. Khrushchev
agrees or dlsngrees with me. I hope thlS
Government, Mr. President, w11l never,
out of a timorous reeling that ~\f. Khrushchc\' may dlsapproH', !all to stand !or
"'·hat It must at.nnd for. Equally, Mr.
President., I hope that this Government
v.ill never tall to act as It must. act out of
an e\·en more Llmorous tecllnc that :1.1r.
Khrushchev may appro\e. What I said
on this point on February 12 I behe\'e
bears repeallnz. I aatd then, and I say
acaln today:
H we are to be prrpartd
In OtrmM}',

I~

wtll bo

«» tact!

thlll cr!ds
bccvme

lx'6~ no~ ~o

dl.tr."":.ed or ~b ' ~ b~ ~:he t'l<1ata anl1 ~u""'
o! Soviet beh3~tor. 'nu= tundam ..ntnl queatt<.n or policy tor WI 15 not ao mueh •hlllt

the Russians are looking tor In Oermany.
We know wha~ they a.re looking for and th"Y
may ;ery well sdu 1t whlla we amuso or
fuelnate oW"Selvea by uytng to lnt.nprH
the charade.. ot RU&Btan bebavu.r.

No. Mr Prestdent.lt Is more lmport.nnt
to us far more Important, to know 11;hnt.
we ourselves are seek.tnc in OermanY.
We must bri.ng to this crisis not only
courage, but also conviction. \Ve must
bring t.o it a ~ltlve and understandable
policy which meets our essential national
needs and the essenttal needs ot freedom,
and, lf possible. meets them In peace.
It was that thought, .Mr. Prcsldl'nt,
which prompted me to hat nine polnt1; for
exploration In a search for n po.slUvo
policy on Germany lo.\t February 12.
Some o! these points were then. or at
least have s!nce become, n part of the
present olflclal policy or tile United
States. Others are not a. purt or thnt
policy. They represent whnt. t.o ml'.
seem rational approaches to various
aspects of the problem or Germany, In
great. measure. th('y are not orll!lnal except in their restatement, 81> my Insert.'>
in the CONCRESSlOS.\L REC'OIID Of FebrUary 16. 1959, will show. But tor their restatement in t.he context. o! the speech.
I WlSh to make lt. clear thnt I clnlm Cull
responsibility.
&EC.~Pirt:'LATlON or Tlll: NISI: POINTS
Mr. President. I :,hould now tn:c to
review the rune pomts and to discuss
their status in omclal pohcy nt the pr~
ent time, as well as certain of the comments which ha\·e b~n ma<!e upon them.
On February 12 I sa1d:
I can be wrong, And I atand reAdf to aecept
a ~t~: lllumtnall cn ot Ute prohlt·m Ulrough
dlscusslon ar.d drbate In the Senntc.

I say that agam. I may ndd, howcv('r,
that lit.tle whlch has smce tran J>ln.·d or
has smce been said prompts me to
modify these polnt.s In any slcutilcant.
de~n·ee.

Point 1: There musL be no n·trcaL o!
the forces of freedom nt I3erltn. M1·.
President, I said that, not once. but nL
least six times during tile cour1.e of my
remarks on Eebruary 12. Weeks llcforc
that date. I had publicly endorsed a clrn!t
Senate resolution wh!ch would have upheld the position of the admim~tmtlon to
stand fast That, I may ndd, 1::. the only
resolution on the Ocrmt~n situation
which I have endor.sed so Car.
So far as I know. there h:\S not been
any si!nlificant d11Tcrence nmong Democrats and Republtcans, or between the
Senate and the excutive branch or the
Government, on the need to stand fast
at Berlin. CerLninly there r.e\Cr ha.s
been on my part..
Point 2: The German leaders or the
t.wo Berlin commun!Ues z;hould be urced
to begin serious etrort.s to unlry the public senices and municipal covernmcnt. ot
that city. I know, Mr. Prestdent., that
there are those who will say l.hls approach is illusory and unrcallsUc: thl\t.
the East Germans cannot be txpect.cd to
a'!'Tee even on a common sewage system.
let alone on a common munJctp,LI gov(·rnment. I would point out In reply, however, that if Berlm doc:; not hnvc n com-

Feb1·uary .!6

mon sewage system. It does have a common subway system. U the German
leader of f.:ast. and West Berlin can
agree on that, as they have, is 1t be~·ond
the realm or the possible thai. they may
a rec on other common public services,
parUculnrly it they mean to ha\·e peace:
or that they may reach a series or a •reemcnts which might ultlmateh· lead to a
single muniCJpal government for the
ciLy? I must. ask: What stands m l!Je
v.n\' or an inltin~1ve of this kind? What
v.lll be lost by trym~: to bring about this
PI'Ol:tess towa1d municipal unity m Berlin? lt we mean to have peace. 1 believe the elTon should be made. It should
be made not only to ease the danger of
\\ar a~ this most cnttcal pomt. m Germany: lt should be made, too. because
If it IS succi'~ ful, out or the microcosm
of D<'rhn could emerge patterns of unlftca.tton for all of Ocrm:my.
nm·Jin, or course, Is an aspect of the
whole l>t·oblem or German unification but
I~ Is ntso the most pressing and compelling n.~pcct. It tS at Berlin and along
th~ routes of access to that cit.y that the
dnnsct· of conflict is greatest. In thnt.
sr.nse tt requires the most immedinll' attention, t·ven lf solution to 1ts prolllem
or unification may be merely b~· means
or interim soluttons, pendmg the outcome or the "~~:hole problem or Oerman
unlf1cnllon. SO tar as I know. ~rr. President, at present we are domg nothln.;,
man otn lal sense, to bring about an attcmpt.ut munlctpal uruty m Bertin.
P.:>lnt 3: The conc1hatory senices or
the United !'\ntlons and. part:cularly, or
Its Secretary General. should be enltstcd.
to try to dC\'clop an aii-Ber~m &ovemment. lf such a go\·emmcnt does
cmerce !n the murucipality, then a
United Nations emergency force should
replace both Cornmunls& and Allied
fore~ In mnmtaing free access to the
city from all directions. pending a l!l'ncral senlement of the German problem.
So Car as I know. Mr. Pres1dent. no
official steps ha\'C been taken In this
d1rrcuon. There are hints. Mr. Prc~i
clcnt, that If trouble does develop at Berlin. then the matter will be taken to the
Utui,C<l NaLtons I would deem It a. welcome chanJCe. Mr. President, for once t.o
brii'IP the United Nations into an int~r
natlonnl pu1.zle before, not after. th~:
pieces IHlVc been hopelessly scat.te1ed.
Tho~.c in the Senate who saw fit to
comment on many parts of my l.l~t.
st.ntt•rnent generally refrained !rom comment on thiS polnt. 1 am not. prepared
to conclude, however. that in Oermany
at tlus lime there Is no poss1ble const.ructtve role !or the Urut.ed Nations
and the Secretary General. I bclle\·c
that there Is somethln:~ to be !'aid for an
attempt to brlno;: the Unl:ed Nations mto
the slt.unUon. now. In the role or fireprc\·ention, not. merely later, in the role
or nren ht.r.c. For my part. I '"oultl
much prefer to see the whole city or
Berlin neutrnllz.."'d on an int.enm basis,
under United Nations auspices, lf that
wn be obt.:Uned, rather than to ha\·c
Ea.s~ German a •ents of the SOviet Union
sl.:lmt>!ng the permits o! western a!lled
transport.<~ to West Berlin. We can not.
know v. hether ~uch an anan~tement can
be obtained w1tll we try to obtain 1t.
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And even l1 we cannot, what. shall we
have sacrltlced by trying?
Points 4 nnd 5: Unless a unified. neutmlized BerLin under Unit.ed NaUons·
auspices is e~tnbllshed as an interim
measure, thf.'n Western forces must remam In Berlin. regardle..«S of whether
the Russians leave. It is t1me to think
seriously, however, o! replacing as
rap1dly as possible the thousands of nonGerman alUed mllltary personnel In Bcrline v.1th West German militia.
Here, IU!ain. Mr Pre•idmt. I find In
present policy nothing comparable to this
suggestion. Pres..nt policy, says, in
effect. that lhe Russians must stay In
Berlin-In spirit, IC not in bcdr. Apnrt
from the fact thnt I see no praclleable
v.-ay to make them stay In either tody or
spirit i! they wl.sh to go, 1 am most reluctant to go along v:tth a pollcy that
&eek.:> t.o reqwre the Russtans to stay anywhere westward. 11 they prop;;.se to take
even a few steps backward-eastv.•ard
I am fully aware that their goln~ may
complicate our r(maintng In Becrlin. We
shall be face to Caef.', then, with East Get·mans. They wl!l be Communls.s. to be
sure--but. ne\'erthelcss. Germans. not.
Russ1ans. The Allied forces may well be
compeUed. 111 the la~t analYSIS, to face
them, II we mean to stay m Bel'lin at aU
costs.
It was an awareness o! this probabili~Y.
Mr. President, v.hlch prompted me to
suggest that I~ Is Ltmc to t.hlnk scrlousiy
of replacing the thousands of allied military personnel In West Berlin whh West
German malitia. lf there Is to be a loss of
life among East. Cermans, in order to
prrserve v.h:H ts, In the last a~alys's. a
\Vest German position c\en more than
an nlhcd posmon Ill Bcrhn. then tt seems
to me best that. the aliacd forces move
as quickly as possible to the re ene. rven
as t.he Russtnns uncnd to do on the other
side. This as not n matter of "pas lng
the buck." It Is a mattrr of recognizm!(
that among Germans ns nmon~ others,
blood may wei) prove tlucker than ldeolo .1es.
11. v;oJll 'be a tral!edy If men must die In
this satuatlon In any event. It will hurt
the cause of freedom in Germany even
mon~. howe\•er, It th~ Germans who may
lose thetr lives In a limited conflict !or
access to Berhn Jose them by the uctlon
of foreign forces.
I know, Mr. Presltlrnt. thaL there are
grave risks In usmrr West Germ:m forces
in thiS Cashton Once lnJ<'ctcd Into the
situation at Berltn, It Is dtlllcult to foresee the conunsenc:es which ma~· subl'<'quenth nrase. 'lhnt is why I snld It Is
t•me to think sc••ou..Jy of using them. not
that it Is time to u:>e them. The rtsks
must be wei' hc<l In the li::ht of all the
ln!ormat1on and csumatcs available to
the Execut1vc. They must be v.clf.;hed
n~:ahlsL the countless nsks or trying to
preserve, wtth Alhed forces. a status quo
m a satuatton v. hlch will chan;::e, InevitAbly, once the Russl:tns have left Berlm. There may be sound reasons !or
not taking thts course or subslltutlnl"
West Germans lor the Allied forces nc
West Berlin. There are no sound reaSOilS. however. for not exploring fully
Its impltcauons within our own GovernNo

3~-10

ment and with Allied governments, or
for failing t.o do so promptly,
Point 6: There must be a great deal
or talk between Germans who are ID
aut.hority in the Federal Republic and
Germans who purport to be In authority
In the Eastem zone.
This iS the POint, Mr. President, of
which much has been made in com-ments on my remarks of Februnry 12.
It seems to me that a monumental Issue
has been generated here, although, In
1act, no subSt.anttal Issue exists.
The administration-the Western allies-have proposed talks with the Ru.sslans. at which each side might have
German observers. In other words, East
Germans and West Germans are both to
be admitted to these t..alkS on Germany,
1! the Russta.ns accept the Western pro-
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The Secretary of State made clear, long
before my speech of February 1~ that
all-Oennan elections need not be essential as a first step In German unltlcatlon. I do not know at what stage they
would become esse"Qtlal, nor, with aU
due respect. do I believe anyone else does
at. thl.s time.
The Secretary has recognl.zed that ree.Uty, and I applaud his recognition of
it. I say further. however. that unless
the hand of pollUcal terror begins to
ll!L In East Germany there Is a danster
to freedom in any form o! unification
which may be tried. While this point
has not been explicitly stated by the Secretary, I am sure that those who are
responsible :for the conduct of foreign
policy are not unaware of it.
Point 8: The Westem allies and the
posal.
Soviet Union must guarantee for a peNow. Mr. President, does anyone be- riod of time the unified Germany which
lle\·e that to talks on the German prob- may emerge from discussions among the
lem, these Germans-East and Wes~ Germans. They must see to It that
Germans-are going to do nothing but Cermany Is neither subjected to miliobserve? No, Mr. President; they arc tary pt·essw·cs !rom its neighbors nor
obviously going to talk, the West Ger- becomes a source o! military pressures
mans through the allied nations. the East to its neighbors.
Germans through the Soviet Union. If
Again, Mr. President. there ls no disthere is a dillerence between official pol- agreement on this obvious point. It has
Icy and what I suggested in this respect, long been a part. of the pOlicy or this
iL is certainly a nltnor one. U 1 may Government t.o reeogni2e that a peace
draw an analogy, perhaps I can make tllc treaty for ~rmany, which provides !or
difference clear. I suggested, In effect, the reasonable security needs of Its
that the Germans-Enst and· West-go neighbors, lncludmg the Soviet Union,
orr Into another room and try to come Is an essential o! peace. One may dllfcr
up with concrete proposals on the prob- with the way ~his obJective has been
lem ot German unification, which they pu1·sued, but there are few ditrerences
would then lay before the allied power:; as to its essentle.Uty.
and the Soviet Unton, for approval and
Point 9: It Is essential that our policy,
!or 1!\Jarantee.
NATO's policies, do not exclude a careMany or lho.c;e who have commented ful constdemtlon-may I repeat that
on this proposal have said m e!I.ct: word, "consideratlon"--of the Rnpack:t
"No. That Is a dangerous procedure." plan. the Eden plan for a demilitarized
They have said-those who endorse pres- zone in middle Europe, or similar proent offici!\! policy on this point-thQt posa13 1n connection wltll the WJJficuthe West Germans must whisper in the tion of Germany, predicated-may I
ear of the allies what they think should repeat that word, "pred1cated"--or conbe done about unification and the East tingent upon the outcome of the conGermans must whisper In the ear of the ferences on surprise attack. and suspenSoviet Union. Then, the We-tern allies sion of nuclear tests now going on In
and the $o\'1Ct Union ~:ill add their own Geneva.
thoughts and try, out of the conglomeraThe Western Powers ha.ve indicated
tion. to reach an agreement.
an interest in negotiating a European
Mr. President. either way is agreeable sacurlty pact.. We are now seeking an
to me. Out or my own limited experi- agreement. at Geneva, on the problem or
ence at International conferences. how- nuclear tCJ;t!ng and the prevention o!
ever, I have my own views as to '1\'hlch surprise attack.
way l.s likely to offer greater pre<pect for
Further. I am given to understand
success. Those who now conduct foreign that It is the PQIIcy of this dovernmcnt
poltcy have theirs. I am more than Will- to recognize thM agreement Is pos~l
Ing to try their way II they believe it will ble to exclude missile bases· !rom 1\11
v.ork. I have a teehng, however. that German soiL Slm!Ia.rly, that it. ls posbefore we are done with this mat..ter or sible w thin out foreign forces In West
whispering In ears and the friction of no Germany In 1·etum !or a thlnnlng out
contact between the Germans. we shall of Sovtet forvcs In East Germany.
be more thnn Willing t.o try others.
rt that is the case. Mr. President.
Point 7: All-German elections may not there 1s no basic Incompatibility between
be essential to peace and to freedom, but the essentials that. I listed and what
there must be some opportunity for tho official poUcy 1s prepared-1 repeat that
people of E11.st Germany, as there Is In word, "preparcd"-to do. The obJec\Vest Germany, to express the1r PJllt cal tive Is the same. I reserve the right.
preferences and to part:clpate In politi- however, to examine subsequently the
cal affairs without terror. Unless !.here way we are gO!Dg about tryin~ to
is, the search for peace can lead to the reach it.
jeopardiZing of freedom..
SIMILA!tiTil':S DI'TWTJ!N OJ'?'lCtAL POI..ICT ANI)
.Nt:fE I'OfNT8
Here again, Mr. President. I do not
believe there Is a basic difference beThe differences between what we are
tween lhe present policies of this Oov- doing, as a matter of official pollcy, and
ernment and the view which I stated. what I suggested as the essentials of a
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posluve Weltt'l"n policy on Germany, are
not numeruus. In omclal policy-without a shadow of a doubt on tho> part
or nn}onc. ell.her Democrat or RepubliCilll-We nre committed tO stand fast at.
B"rlln. We are committed t.o the partlc1patlon or Germans of both 7.ones m
the discussion or the prob!ems or German
unity. We are eommiLted to explore "A'ays
other than all-German elceUons, at least
as a be~lnniDB of the solution to the
problem of Germ.tn unity, We are prepared to consider proposals v. hlch stek
to limit certain types o! \\'eo pons and the
allen military forces In both parts of
G rmnny v.IUtin the framework of all1-:uropenn aecunty nrrnnt:cments. With
these !'.SSCntlala, .Mr. President, I expressed substnntlg,J agrel'mcnt ln my remnrks of }'<brunry 12. nlthou~h I rna~·
differ ln pnrtlculnn; with respect to the
way theY arc bclllK presently pursued.
DIJ n ftltHCh Willi OFHC'IAL POLICY

The basic paints nt which I diverge
from wllut Is pre~cnt otnclnl policy, I believe, tu·<• these.
First. Ofllcinl policy, In etTrct. says that
the Russians cannot. le~we Berlin or the
routes or acces.s to the clt.y from the
West: certainly, that. they cannot. leave
In spirit. and. perhaps, not even ln body.
For my part, I would hnve no particular
desire to £t·c them r.tay, In body or in
sptrlt. even If they could be persuaded
from golne. v.·hlch I doubt.
&cone! Official pollcl dot>s not ~eek
actively to try to bring about a unification of the munlclp:tl :scn1ca and government of the two Bcrllns at. the prt>Sent
time. 1 believe that eltort &hould be
DUde.

Third. omclal pollc}' docs not seek to
enU.st the United Nations In the Berhn
crists at this t.mc. l''or mr part. I beheve It Is high time thl\t thl.s be done:
portlcularly, thnt. the concallntory !l('rv-

Jce.o; or the Secretary General be sou11ht.
Fourth. Otflclnl policy t'l\'cs no evidence o! considering replacing the
thousands ot Alltrd forcts ln Berlin with
Wc.:.t. Germans. Ir v.e art' not going t.o
move or can no~ 1110\ c tn the direction
ot trying to brln~: about the unity and
Interim neutralization or all Berlin
throul!h tJ.N. conclllntlon, then. I believe.
for the reasons l have already staled. we
must give ~crlou~ consideration to
making this I'Cplttct'ment..
~'ONt'Lt

Dl.NO COM M t' NT8

Finally, Mr. President. 1 must bring to
the attention of the St'nate the testlmQnY or Q('nCI't\1 Maxv.cll D. Taylor, the
Chic! of Stnfl of the Army before the
S•·nftte ntsn.rmamcnt Subcommittee on
F~brunry 2. ~tlmony which w:~s released only lnst weelu·nd. The General
said, In effect, that there must be tOtal
mobUizatlon of this Nation It v. e are to
resist force In ncrlln. I must ask: What
Is being done tO bring nbout this total
mobilization, or arc y;c t.o ~ume that.
It v.IU not be llect'3:13ry?
I hope deeply, Mr. President, that.
rorec v. Ill not be brought Into play at
Berlin but there .Is no certain promil.e m
prcsen~ clrewnst:lnccs that tt lliiU not be.
I reltcrnto my bt'llcf that lf there l.s to
be n chance t.o nvold lt.s use. "a West.e:n
inltlatl\ e for peace Is csscntlnl."

The point.& which I raised in my remarks on February 12 were dWa;ned to
lndtcate a possible direction tor that. tru-

tt.auve.
Of equal Importance with the dulre
for peace, :Mr. President. ls the enti1:Y
and forbearance with which thl.S Government pursues this great need and
desire of mankind. or greatf'St lmJ)Ortance is a nauonalleader,;hip which acts
positively for peace.
It the President l~ds In that !a.shlon,
he v.·ill find the people ot this Nation
and the people of the free lliOrld wUl
be soladly beh!nd him.
~Ir.
FULBRIGHT. Mr. President.
will the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
I\fr= FULBRIGHT. I should like to
take this opportunity to express my npprecla.tion, and I know the npprcclntlon
o! the Senate. for the very fine Job the
Senator from Mont.nna hnl! clone In
bringing thl.s question before this body
and the country, and In developing IL
In such a logical and etTecUve wo.y, ns
he did today and ns he did on Lhc pt·evious occasion. I regret very much thnt
illness p1·evented me !rom being here on
the occasion of the previous speech on
this subjec~ by the Senator from Montana.. The Senator has already Inspired
a great deal of very fruitful discussion
of this issue. and I think the country
and the Senate will bcnent Immeasurably from the ef'l'ort.s of the S<-nator from
Montana. I WISh tO Jom all the other
Senators who have comphm~ntcd the
Senator from Montana for his effo1 ts,
which have contnbuted so much to better understanding ot this problem.
Mr. :MAl-;SFIELD. I thank the diStinguished chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations. 1 recall to the
Senator's memory that we came to the
Congress totether In 1943. and amcc
that ume we nave had a fairly close re·
lationsh•P in the foreaen policy field. Of
course I am Indebted tO the Senator
from Arkansas. the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations. for
his kind words, for his unfailing under.
standing, and for his toloranct- and
streqgth over the years gone by
Mr. President, I now wish to turn to
anobher subject.
The PRESIDING OFI-'ICER. The
Senator !rom Montana has the !loot'.

February
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